Defence Costing !

The Collins class submarines we last purchased for the Royal Australia navy were a disappointment.  From day one they fell short of our expectations.  They were noisy - and that makes them vulnerable to anti-submarine measures and they suffered innumerable breakdowns.  Rarely were more than one or two available for sea patrol at any given time.   They are now ending their service life and the subject of their replacements is deeply enmeshed in politics.

There is pressure from the unions to build them at the ASC Shipyard in South Australia and the Defence department is hesitant.  When this shipyard was awarded the air warfare destroyers contract it's performance was abysmal - way behind the delivery date and miles over budget.  There is a contention that the union deliberately ordered a "go slow " to eke out the jobs and keep the payrolls coming in for the workforce.   The navy is hoping for twelve new submarines and this will be a very big defence outlay - probably somewhere between $36 and $80 billion, depending on where the contract is sourced.

There are two probable options.  Build them completely in Australia - and that means using the existing workforce at ASC shipyards, or buying the shell and engine component from another country and fitting them out in Australia.   All the costings indicate that this latter option will be the most economical in money terms.

Unfortunately, there is another issue that must come into contention.  The ASC shipyard employs the people with the skills to do important defence work and unless they are awarded the submarine contract it is certain that they will be dissapated.  If that happens, we will no longer be able to meet our own defence needs for want of a skilled workforce.   Of course, exactly the same argument would reappear when the last submarine was completed.

It is reasonable to suppose that most of this skilled workforce would be required if the fitting out were done here in Australia.  Japan has a reputation for building very good submarines and their costings are attractive.  Turning a shell into a formidable weapon involves the selection of kit and combining it to create a cohesive fighting unit to our own design.  It is likely that the unions are overstating the loss of skills to enhance their claim on this contract.

We can not afford a repeat of the Collins class fiasco.  The submarine has emerged as the prime fighting force of the world's navies and it clearly has the edge in both an offense and a defence role. We are totally reliant on our sea lanes for the import of petroleum products, and without those our structure would crumble in a very short time.   There is a subtle arms race in the south Pacific and we would fall behind at our peril.

The biggest problem seems to be reaching a political solution, making a decision - and awarding a contract.  We can not afford a gap in maritime services and if this gets hung up in parliament that would be a likely outcome.