Incompetence - in Command Ranks !

The enquiry into the seventeen hour Lindt siege in December 2014 is revealing clear evidence that both the police command structure and the necessary protocols that should be in place to bring such an event to a successful conclusion - were sadly lacking.

There is no doubt that the lesser ranks - the marksmen deployed as snipers and the assault team that put their lives on the line when they rushed the cafe - did their job bravely and deserve credit, but behind the scenes there was absolute chaos.   There was uncertainty about who had the authority to give the order to send in the assault team and exactly what was happening in the cafe was subjected to very different interpretations.

One of the problems was that the police command post was setup in a vastly unsuitable building.  It was allocated a small room, devoid of whiteboards and serviced by a single landline phone.  That - and a mobile phone - were totally swamped with the deluge of calls coming in as the hostages were able to use their mobile phones freely.   Many calls from the hostages were diverted to other parts of the building - or went unanswered.   This valuable form of intelligence mostly went unrecorded.

Incredibly, earlier the Federal government had  spent hundreds of thousands of dollars gifting every state with a huge truck equipped as a mobile command centre for just such emergencies.  It was spacious and had whiteboards to plan strategies and very importantly it delivered state of the art communications and recording equipment.   We now learn that the New South Wales vehicle was damaged in a weather event and not repaired.  In 2011 is was disposed of by auction - and not replaced.

Communications between those observing the siege and the command centre differed badly.  When the gunman fired his shotgun as hostages escaped there was the disparity of whether the shot was fired " at " the hostages over their heads as a warning.  Clearly, that issue of clarity was crucial to making a decision of immediate intervention.    Unfortunately, just which senior officer had that decision responsibility was not clear at the time.

Perhaps this debacle was needed to jolt the upper echelon of our police service to put in place a a siege command structure that is clear to all concerned, and that it's commander has the authority to decide whether the police or special forces from the military are best suited to do what needs to be done.  This is not the time for turf battles.

That lack of a mobile command centre is a disgrace.  Are we to believe that police vehicles are not covered by insurance ?  How apathy could let such a vital piece of equipment rot unrepaired and then be casually disposed of at auction is unbelievable.  It's value was clearly illustrated in the Lindt siege and a replacement must be urgently provided.

Past sieges have mainly been caused by the breakdown of relationships between people, often  exacerbated by alcohol or drugs.  Many have been of a domestic nature and the passage of time has cooled tempers.  This Lindt siege was the deliberate action of a relgious fanatic who intended to end the lives of his hostages and hoped that his own death would confer immortality as a martyr.

There is a high probability that this may be repeated.  Suicide bombing is a tactic employed in what has become a holy war and adherents are encouraged to launch attacks on perfect strangers.  It is important that our reactive forces are clear on their line of communication and action ability to end sieges with the least loss of innocent lives.

Lessons from the Lindt siege must be learned - and put into action immediately !